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Introduction
One of the effects of the recent rapid technical advance is a change in the technological structure of many firms. As new technologies have emerged and been integrated into existing products and technology spaces, the need to incorporate many new types of expertise both in production activities, and in innovation has created the "multi-technology firm" (see for example Powell et al., 1996; Grandstand and Sjolander, 1990; Grandstand, 1996; Teece and Pisano, 1989) . This broadening of the technological base creates a difficulty in that the knowledge and technology necessary for innovation may lie outside a firm's traditional core competence. A now common strategy for addressing this problem, adopted by more and more firms, is to form alliances both with competitors and with non-competing firms and institutions. Inter-firm cooperation can be extremely effective in increasing the circulation of tacit knowledge, and in creating possibilities for a firm to acquire knowledge outside its boundaries. Consequently, these co-operative agreements for R&D have grown dramatically in number since the 1970s.
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In this paper we are concerned with inter-firm alliances as the mechanism through which industry networks are built. It has been observed that different industry networks (and the same industry at different points in time) have different structural properties (see for example Roijakkers, 2003; Powell et al., 2005) . This could be explained by differences in the underlying knowledge and information environments in which the networks are being built. To explore this possibility we develop a model of alliance formation and examine the nature of the networks that emerge under different knowledge and information structures. 2 We use the model to address two issues: how does the nature of the innovation task affect network structure? and how does the nature of a firm's embeddedness affect network structure?
Previous work on network formation has focussed on firms' network motivations, attempting to understand why firms seek certain positions, for example trying to fill structural holes (Burt, 1992) , increase their positions of centrality (Podolny, 1993) or form clustered neighbourhoods (Coleman, 1988; Walker et al., 1997) . Firms use position in the network as a competitive tool, and something which can be manipulated to increase profits or control. (Baum et al., 2003 is a good example here.) The network structure then emerges out of network-oriented activity, and is determined by firms' strategies. By contrast, the gametheoretic literature treats the network as emergent, in the sense that firms do not explicitly consider network position, but only whether a particular bilateral link is valuable. 3 This literature looks for stable, unchanging networks, finding that common stable structures are empty, star and wheel networks (Jackson, forthcoming, provides a nice survey of this literature, including an overview of research on R&D networks). A recent exception is Goyal and 1 See Hagedoorn (2001) for a review and discussion of this trend. 2 To model strategic technological alliances in their entirety is far beyond the scope of this paper. Technological alliances can be very rich and varied, and firms have many motivations for entering into them. See Oliver (1990) for a discussion of the motivations of firms to form outsider relationships. But for our purposes we focus on a single effect, namely the production of shared knowledge, and how firms' behaviour in this regard leads to the emergence of networks.
3 In many models agents do consider indirect connections in evaluating a particular potential partner. However, they do not explicitely consider how they would be positioned in the overall network structure in deciding whether or not to form a link. 4 Because the act of forming an alliance can change a firm's properties, thereby changing its desirability to other potential partners, the model we develop here is more evolutionary than many of the gametheoretic models of network formation which assume that a firm's inherent properties are stable over time (though of course its value as a partner can change if it becomes more central in the network).
5 See also Axelrod (1997) . 6 These three types of embeddedness span the two types of explanations for partner choice in the literature, namely resource complementarity and social structural context. In this regard the model we develop here is in the tradition of empirical work such as Gulati (1995) and Chung et al. (2000) which find support for both explanations.
7 Recent empirical analysis of networks has focused to a large extent on their structural properties, in particular whether various networks are small worlds. In general the answer is yes. Co-authorship in a variety of academic disciplines (Newman, 2001 ); patent citation in US biotech (Johnson and Mareva, 2002) ; interlocking corporate directorships in the US (for example, Davis et al., 2003) ; technology alliances (Duysters and Verspagen, 2004) ; the BRITE/EURAM network and the 5th Framework TSER network all have small world properties, and there is a consensus that small worlds are pervasive. A second structure that has received attention recently is the scale free network (Barabasi and Albert, 2000) . Riccaboni and Pammolli (2002) find that networks in the life sciences and ICT industries have scale free properties.
we present the results of the experiments as they pertain to firms, neighbourhoods and the economy, focussing on network structures and properties of knowledge distribution. The final section concludes, discussing the implications of the results and giving some suggestions for directions in which the model could be extended.
Firm Co-operation
The increase in alliances created to gather or exchange knowledge has led to a new view of industry structure. In the past we have observed hierarchies and markets as dominant structures. Implicit is a well-defined notion of the boundary of the firm. As knowledge (and indeed many other things) are passing between firms in what cannot be described as purely market transactions, researchers have begun to discuss the network-based organization (see Powell, 1990 for example). Networks differ from markets and hierarchies in a variety of ways, but can be seen as depending on particular types of interactions between pairs of agents within the economy. Within a network structure, firm boundaries are relatively porous, and a firm survives by having good contacts with other firms who hold complementary assets.
The strategic alliance is a central part of the process creating a network structure within an industry. For any firm seeking to expand its innovation capabilities through alliance formation, though, there is the question of choosing a partner. Selecting a partner, acknowledging that many other firms are doing the same, becomes a strategic issue that firms must deal with. A basic means of analysing this issue is to observe that alliances do not exist in a vacuum, but are embedded in a variety of ways. Research has focussed on three: relational embeddedness; cognitive embeddedness; and structural embeddedness. Each of these features of a possible partnership lends it value, and they play a central role in determining the desirability of different potential partners.
In the context of finding an alliance partner, cognitive embeddedness refers to two firms' abilities to integrate effectively their respective knowledge. Empirical analyses of alliance formation conclude that firms look for partners with the best technological fit in the sense of providing missing resources. 8 In this regard, one difficult issue has to do with how resources of partners are combined, which in turn determines what complementary means. The model we develop has a rich enough characterization of knowledge and innovation that we can address this issue directly. When two firms innovate jointly, the action will be most effective if their knowledge profiles complement each other. In the literature there is a consensus that the effectiveness of cooperation has an inverted U-shape in cognitive distance. If firms are too close together, their knowledge overlaps too much and there is little point in sharing; if they are too far apart they have difficulty understanding each other, and so sharing is too difficult. The arguments are very appealing intuitively (see for example Grant, 1996 or Nooteboom, 1999 , and Mowery et al. (1998) find this effect empirically.
One consequence of a knowledge partnership is that partners will develop closer cognitive ties. That is, their knowledge profiles will, in general become more similar. Mowery et al. (1998) , for example state that "technological overlap between joint venture partners after alliance formation is greater than their pre-alliance overlap" (p. 517). 9 This has the feature of increasing embeddedness, but after a time may make firms less attractive to each other, since as they become similar, there is less to share. Our model permits us to examine how it depends on the nature of the innovation process, and how firms integrate their competencies in that process.
Co-operation between firms is risky, and is marked by uncertainty regarding the skills of the partner, joint ability to work together, the potential partner's reliability, his goals and so on. (See Powell 1990, p. 318 for a discussion of these risks.) This can be cast as an issue of incomplete information, and the most obvious way to reduce the uncertainty is to improve the information used in choosing a partner. There are two sources of this type of information: experience and other firms. The first relates to relational embeddedness, the second to structural embeddedness (see Uzzi 1996 Uzzi , 1997 for discussion).
Past experiences with a firm will both improve abilities to cooperate, and yield information about that firm. Co-operation implies mutual knowledge and sharing of routines, representations, ways of thinking, the ability to share tacit knowledge and so on, all of which can be built through repeated co-operation (Garcia-Pont and Nohria, 2002). Repeated interaction also creates trust, both in terms of motives and in terms of competencies (Sako, 1991; Dodgson, 1996) . These considerations create inertia in partnership formation, and stability in network structures: firms will, all else equal, prefer partners they have worked with in the past.
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The second source of information about potential partners is other firms (see Kogut et al., 1992 for example). Those who have worked with a firm will have experience that they can, in principle, share with others who might be considering working with that firm. This is captured by the idea that many alliances exhibit structural embeddedness: there is some tendency for firms to find partners that are close to them in network space. In the model we develop below, this source of information is included explicitly: a firm's perceived value to me as a partner increases if my previous partners have had good experiences with that firm. My network of immediate contacts is a source of information about possible future contacts.
The entanglement of these different effects -learning about partners from shared history and learning from other partners -makes analysis of network formation tricky. Chung et al. (2000) and Gulati (1995) , examining very different industries, find that both indirect ties and a history of direct interactions affect the probability that two firms will form a partnership in the future, but that the strength of the effect decreases (and turns negative for the indirect effect) as the number of (direct or indirect) interactions increases. 11 We have argued above that the decreasing strength of the former effect arises from the dynamics of strategic complementarity. As two firms continue to interact and learn from each other, their knowledge bases will eventually have too big an overlap (and indeed this convergence is what Mowery et al., 1998 and Uzzi, 1997 find), and strategic complementarity falls. Such an effect would explain a decrease in strength, and even a negative effect, of past interactions on the probability that two firms interact in the future. The model we develop displays this inverted-U effect, but it is not assumed directly, rather it arises from the way we have modelled the more basic dynamic processes of knowledge creation.
The model
We present here a schematic description of the model before turning to the formal description. Each period every firm innovates, either by itself or in collaboration with one other firm. When two firms form an alliance they pool their knowledge and use their joint knowledge as input into knowledge production. The success of any alliance is not guaranteed, but is determined by the firms' existing structural and relational embeddedness. Being more tightly embedded in both ways will increase the probability of success. If the alliance is successful, and new knowledge is created, it is added to each firm's existing knowledge. After one innovation attempt, at the end of the period, all partnerships dissolve. In the next period firms form new alliances, possibly with previous partners. Repeated bilateral partnership formation generates an economy-wide network structure; repeated innovation changes the knowledge endowments of firms and of the economy.
Four assumptions are worthy of comment. First, the assumption that each firm is engaged in a single partnership each period is restrictive relative to empirical results in which firms often have several bilateral relationships simultaneously. The assumption is made for technical reasons -with single partnerships, each period the structure of relationships is unique (see below for a discussion), whereas if firms could form more than one partnership this uniqueness disappears, and thereby drives significant amounts of randomness into the model. This makes the model more difficult to control, and the results more difficult to understand and interpret.
Second, in the matching algorithm there is an implicit assumption that firms know completely all other firms' knowledge profiles. This is a strong assumption, though maybe less aggressive than first appears. Significant amounts of information are available, though, through for example patent searches and firms' public activities such as publicity, hiring, some investments, and so on. In addition, the quality of information a firm has about another firm will degrade with the distance between them. This effect exists in the model (albeit in a very stylized way) through the way we model success probabilities. So some of the effects of imperfect information about others' knowledge profiles is present.
Third, we assume that firms judge the value of a partnership on the basis of immediate knowledge production, excluding other, and longer term objectives. Including longer term objectives would not destroy the uniqueness of the pair formation, provided both firms have the same evaluation of the partnership. To incorporate those things explicitly in the model adds significant complication, demanding a fully blown goods market with production and consumption. We avoid that by this simplifying assumption. The focus on immediate knowledge production will fail to capture important aspects of partnership formation is some instances, but it is very likely to be behaviourally quite adequate in industries in which either knowledge is advancing very rapidly, or in markets in which the knowledge base is expanding rapidly. In the first case firms have an immediate, dominating concern for innovation, since failing to innovate implies a serious competitive disadvantage. In the second, firms have a strong need for partnerships since typically they cannot produce needed knowledge in house.
Finally, firms have no explicit network motivation. That is, in deciding on their partnerships they do not consider how particular alliances would change their position in the network. Again, this is restrictive relative to empirical results on alliance formation, as firms are motivated by many considerations in forming an alliance. Focussing solely on knowledge related motives permits us to develop a simpler model. It is also the case, though, that even though firms focus solely on knowledge, identifiable patterns in the resulting network structure do emerge. This has two possible implications. The methodological implication is that the types of networks that emerge empirically need not be driven by (nor be evidence for) firms adopting particular strategies vis-à-vis network position in their alliance formation. The second implication comes as a result of the model. While focussing on knowledge creates network structures, there are situations in which firms that appear to have non-standard network positions do better, in terms of knowledge accumulation, than others. For example, in some parts of the parameter space a relatively dense network emerges, but at the same time there is a negative correlation between the number of partners a firm has and its performance in terms of knowledge accumulation. This implies that there may be points in which firms should operate against what appears to be the natural tendency.
We run numerical experiments on this model to examine both the types of network structures that emerge, and the nature of the changes in knowledge held by the firms. The goal is to understand what drives different structures that are observed, both at the level of firm and industry, and how these structures connect to knowledge accumulation at the firm level. We look explicitly at two driving forces: One is the nature of the innovation process and its decomposability, through its effect on the way firms can effectively pool their knowledge. The other is the relative importance of relational versus structural embeddedness in determining the probability of success of a collaboration.
In the subsections that follow we give formal presentations of each of the components of the model.
Knowledge pooling and production
We assume a large but finite population of firms. Each firm, i, is characterised by the amounts it holds of M different types of knowledge. We represent this as a vector of length M, which allows us to think of each firm as located at a point in knowledge space. Knowledge is treated as a form of human capital, of which distinct types exist. By innovating, a firm creates new knowledge and so moves to a new location in the knowledge space.
Because innovation is knowledge creation, when two firms innovate together, both will have more knowledge after the innovation than they had before, and their profiles will be more similar. To capture this, we model knowledge production as a three step process, wherein joint innovation moves firms farther from the origin but closer together in knowledge space.
First, when i and j collaborate, they pool their knowledge to create a joint knowledge vector. Formally, the pooling is done element-wise, and each element, m, of the pooled vector is written as
where v m i is firm i's knowledge of type m, and v ij is the vector of pooled knowledge of i and j.
Second, this pooled knowledge acts as an input into a knowledge production function. For simplicity we use a constant elasticity of substitution function, so the new knowledge created by the collaboration is
Third, if the innovation project is successful, new knowledge is created and is added to each of the partners' knowledge vectors. As the argument of the production function is the joint knowledge profile, it seems natural to let this joint profile also determine the type of knowledge produced. 12 Therefore we assume that when new knowledge is created, the probability that it is of type m is v
If the collaboration fails, both firms get 0. In Equation (1), θ scales the pooled knowledge between the minimum and the maximum level of the partners. This parameter can be related to the nature of the innovation process. If the process is made up of discrete tasks which can be done in isolation, partners will specialize, each doing the task in which he or she is more proficient, with the results brought together at the end to create the complete innovation. By contrast, if the innovation process is more systemic and so not decomposable, each partner will be involved in all aspects. Specialization is not possible, and the weaker partner will act as the "weakest link".
To illustrate, if innovation is separable, since specialization is possible the better econometrician will do the econometrics; the better growth theorist will do the growth theory, and so on. The pooled knowledge vector should be the element-wise maximum of the individual vectors and thus θ is close to one. If the tasks are not separable, the econometrician must explain the econometrics to the growth theorist and vice versa, and the process can only proceed as effectively as the weaker partner allows. The pooled knowledge vector will be the element-wise minimum, and θ is close to zero.
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The advantage of this formalization is that we can avoid specifying a particular distance function, and an optimal distance (the peak of the inverted-U) between partners. Indeed, θ is a parameter we vary, to understand how network structures are affected by the nature of the innovation process itself. More specifically, this implementation permits us to have a richer model of joint innovation than is usually considered, in which a simple distance in knowledge space determines the effectiveness of a partnership.
14 Putting two firms' knowledge together involves considering deeper issues of complementarities, which we capture by the production function approach.
We can observe now that whether or not two firms are complementary will depend on how knowledge can be pooled. On the characterisation given, θ turns out to be a measure of the taste for dissimilar partners. If θ is close to 0 then for any element, m, in which v m j < v m i , firm j reduces the effectiveness of i. The converse is true as well. In this case, firms will be driven to find partners similar to themselves, so they create as little drag on each other as possible. In the extreme, for low enough θ firms will innovate alone. By contrast, if θ is close to 1, a partner cannot hurt you, so firms look for partners whose endowments complement their own since both can benefit from the other's strengths. Implicitly, they search for partners who are different from themselves in the sense of being good where they are bad.
Innovative success and experience
We assume that when a firm or a partnership attempts to innovate, success is not guaranteed. Firms therefore evaluate their possible partnerships on the basis of expected outcomes. Estimates of success probabilities are closely tied up in relational and structural embeddedness (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999) . If a potential partner is embedded relationally, a firm can use its past history with that partner as information. If a potential partner is embedded structurally, a firm can use information from common partners. Our concern is the relative importance of relational versus structural embeddedness as information sources about possible partners.
Formally, define the probability of success, if i and j collaborate in period t, as π ij . Suppose further that their previous collaboration took place τ (i, j) periods ago (so in period t − τ (i, j)). Define the relational credit of the pair (i, j) in period t to be
where 0 < ρ < 1 is a discount factor, and χ ij = 1 if i and j's previous collaboration was successful (0 otherwise). Equation (4) captures the simple assumption of learning to collaborate by successfully collaborating. The more distant in time was the previous success of i and j, the less credit they have in each other's eyes (and the less confidence they have that their next attempt will be a success, and the less likely it is to be one).
In a similar way, define now the structural credit of the pair (i, j) in period t to be
where r ik and r kj are defined as earlier. A sketch of the way this works would be as follows. Suppose firm i is interested in firm j. Firm i then looks through its list of past partners, and when it finds one (k) with whom it was successful (χ ik = 1), it asks, "In your latest interaction with j, were you successful [which determines χ k,j ], and if so, when was that interaction [which determines ρ τ (kj) ]?" The answer to these questions determines r kj . The sum over all its previous partners determines the structural credit between i and j.
In general a firm will consider both relational and structural information or credit, so total credit is a weighted sum
where K is an averaging constant. 15 The parameter α ∈ [0, 1] measures the importance of relational embeddedness in estimating success probabilities. This way c (i, j) accounts for both i's direct information about j (as captured by r ij ) and the information that i gathers through neighbours who are common to i and j, (as measured by s ij ). We assume that success is always possible but never guaranteed, so π is bounded away from 0 and 1, having a range of values: π L ≤ π ≤ π H . Then the probability that the next collaborative attempt is a success is simply assumed to be
and the expected amount of knowledge produced by a cooperation between i and j can be expressed as
This is the amount of knowledge produced in case of success multiplied by the probability that the cooperation succeeds. (Thus firms are assumed to be risk-neutral.) Firms that innovate in isolation have one source of risk removed, namely that associated with having to work with a partner. This does not make autarchic innovation a sure thing though: we assume that a firm innovating alone is successful with probability π H .
15 K = P k χ ik , the number of firms i asks for information about j. Thus s ij /K is the average response about j. The results are not fragile with regard to this assumption. We have explored different specifications of s: sum of responses, responses weighted by discount factors and so on. Qualitatively the results are unchanged.
Pair formation and equilibrium
Each period, firms can form a single collaboration with one other firm. To model the pair formation process we draw on the matching literature. Because we consider a single population of firms rather than two populations (of jobs and workers for instance) matching here is a roommate problem, rather than a standard marriage problem. In a one-sided, roommate, matching problem, each individual i has a strict preference ordering over all other individuals (see Gale and Shapley, 1962) . We generalize the standard problem to include the possibility of self-matching, simply by including in the preferences a value or preference for isolation. A matching is a partition of the population into q singletons and (n − q)/2 pairs of roommates, and said to be stable if there are no blocking pairs. That is if there is no pair of agents (i, j) such that both i prefers j to his current partner, and j prefers i to his current partner. 16 In the particular problem examined here, the preferences are determined by the expected output of the potential pair. That is, i prefers j to k just in case F (i, j) > F (i, k). In the event that i = j the pooled vector is simply the vector of i, and production remains defined as it was above.
Because firms in any pair assign the same cardinal value to their match, (see Equation  8 and its derivation) a unique stable matching always exists. 17 The intuition is that of all possible pairs of firms in the economy one pair produces the biggest innovation. The two firms in that pair will block any matching in which they are not together, because each prefer each other to anyone else. That pair of firms must be in the stable match. A recursive argument on the remaining firms generates a unique stable matching. As we allow for self-matching the argument naturally extends to the case of isolated firms maximizing innovative output.
Numerical experiment
The model just developed represents a complex dynamic process. As such it is impossible to study analytically, so we use numerical experiments to examine how industry behaviour responds to changes in task decomposition (θ) and changes in the relative importance of relational (α) versus structural (1 − α) embeddedness.
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We study a population of 100 firms. At the outset individual knowledge endowments are randomly drawn from a uniform distribution over [0, 1], independently for every element in each firm's knowledge vector. Each period firms form stable pairs (or stay alone) in order to innovate. After innovation, the new knowledge is added to the firms' knowledge; the firms' knowledge profiles change, as does their accumulated experience with partners. At the end of the period all pairs disband, and the process begins again in the following period. Firms focus solely on the myopic maximization of expected innovation, without pursuing any network-oriented goals. In each period the network consists of isolated firms and disconnected pairs, as given by the stable matching. We record firms' partnership histories over a 500 round industry lifetime to produce a weighted network whose properties we study.
We set the minimum and maximum success probabilities to π L = 0.85 and π H = 0.95 respectively. The discount factor is equal to ρ = 0.98. The two parameters θ and α take on values between 0 and 1 inclusive. We explore this space on a 25 × 25 grid of equally spaced points, averaging the results of 10 independent replications at each (θ, α) location.
Parameter effects
Characteristics of the network, knowledge growth and distribution are affected by three parameters: β, which controls the elasticity of substitution in knowledge production; α, the relative value of relational embeddedness; and θ, measuring the decomposability of innovation.
The parameter β determines the ease of substitution between knowledge types in innovation. 19 When β is small, output is determined by the value of the smallest input. Thus firms have strong incentives to find partners, since increasing the minimum element in the knowledge vector is very valuable. As β increases, output is less and less determined by the smallest input, so incentives to find partners diminish, because a firm can compensate for its weak knowledge types with its own strengths. Except when β takes on extreme values, however, this effect has very little influence on the network formation process. Consequently throughout the experiments reported below we leave β unchanged, at a value of 1/4.
The parameter α measures the relative importance of relational versus structural embeddedness in estimating success probabilities with different partners. When the former dominates, there is a natural source of inertia in the search for partners. Relational embeddedness only contributes information about past partners; structural embeddedness is the only source of information about new partners. When structural embeddedness has no value (α = 1), it is impossible to get information about novel partners. Success appears more likely with past partners, since novel partners are assigned the minimum success probability. Thus we would expect to see an increase in the number of partners a firm has as α falls. In addition, structural embeddedness introduces information about partners' partners and so provides a natural avenue by which new partnerships create closed triangles. This effectively increases the cliquishness of the network.
The parameter θ captures the extent to which the innovation task can successfully be decomposed into separable sub-tasks. This in turn affects the number of potentially valuable partners. From the point of view of a single firm, a weakness in one type of knowledge can be compensated for either by an internal strength in a different type or by finding a partner who is strong in that type. The feasibility of the former is determined by the elasticity of substitution in knowledge production (β); the feasibility of the latter 19 Precisely, the elasticity of substitution is 1/(1− β), and scales the production function between a linear function in which output is the sum of inputs (β → 1), and a Leontieff function in which output is the smallest input (β → −∞).
is governed by the decomposability of innovation (θ). Looking at the possibility of firms i and j partnering, if i dominates j in every knowledge type there is clearly no advantage to collaboration from i's point of view. Thus in a partnership a firm will have access to more knowledge of type m, but will also be forced to accept less of type l. This trade-off (between the gain in m and the loss in l) is evaluated differently depending on β and θ. For fixed β, as θ increases a smaller gain is needed to compensate for a given loss. Thus, as θ increases, the number of acceptable partners increases for any firm. 20 Further, repeated interaction makes two firms' knowledge profiles more similar, which decreases their abilities to compensate for each others' weaknesses as just described. Since increases in θ increase the size of innovations the convergence of partners' knowledge happens faster. This implies a stronger tendency to search for novel partners. In a nutshell, when θ is large, new partners are relatively easy to find, and firms switch partners more frequently. We expect, then, a positive correlation between degree and θ.
Results
In the sections that follow we describe how the emergent structural properties of the network respond to the parameters α and θ. Before the detailed analysis, however, to give a visual impression of the results, in Figure 1 we show three characteristic networks from different regions of the (α, θ)-space which differ strongly in terms of degree and cliquishness. Summary statistics for each of the networks are also provided. 21 We first consider strong structural embeddedness with intermediate decomposability (α = 0.1, θ = 0.4). There the average degree is low, many firms innovate in isolation and the largest connected component consists of three densely inter-connected subgroups (cliques) spanned by a small number of ties. When we consider the same level of structural embeddedness but high decomposability in the innovative tasks (α = 0.1, θ = 0.8) the network becomes considerably more dense, the largest component contains almost the entire industry but local clustering falls, suggesting a less structured organization with fewer central individuals. Finally when relational embeddedness is strong and again task decomposability is intermediate (α = 0.8, θ = 0.6) we see little autarchy, some isolated pairs of innovators and a large connected component with little local clustering and few central individuals; i.e. a sparse and fairly random industry network.
Turning now to more detailed analysis, we begin by focusing on the individual firm's partnerships. We consider the number and distribution of partnerships across firms, and how they relate to performance in terms of knowledge production. Both decomposability and structural embeddedness increase the number of the average firms' partnership links. 20 For each firm i in the industry there is an indifference frontier separating autarky from collaboration, running through i's location and obtained by solving for the
Firm i is ready to accept any partner above the frontier and prefers autarky to any partner below. Using the implicit function theorem to differentiate φ(v i ) = φ (v i² ) with respect to θ shows that increasing decomposability lowers firm i's indifference frontier in any dimension, which in general will increase the number of its feasible partners. 21 Precise definitions of each of these statistics are given below. The network representations are obtained using spring embedding in NetDraw. The distribution of links over firms is relatively flat, except for intermediate levels of decomposability and high levels of structural embeddedness, where we observe significant skewness in the distribution. In addition, in that part of the parameter space we find a positive association between final knowledge levels and degree, and also between degree and firms' knowledge accumulation.
At a slightly higher level of aggregation, we turn to local neighbourhoods, and how their structure relates to performance. Local clustering increases as structural information (1 − α) increases in importance, but has a non-monotonic relationship with decomposability, increasing and then decreasing with θ. Performance has a positive correlation with clustering when the overall network is itself highly clustered.
Finally we move to aggregate results and discuss possible goals for innovation policy in terms of production and distribution of knowledge. Equity in the distribution of knowledge, which can be a target for policy, is shown to increase with decomposability. Industry-wide specialization also increases in that same direction, but at the economy level specialization decreases as θ rises.
In each of the results that follow we present a three dimensional surface with α and θ in the (x, y) plane and the variable of interest on the z-axis. The presentation we have adopted is a filled contour plot, of the type seen in atlases. In each figure, darker shades of grey indicate bigger values of the structural parameter (higher points in the z-direction).
Partnerships
To identify partnerships it is first necessary to derive the distance between any pair of firms. We define the distance d (i, j) between i and j as the number of edges in the highest frequency path linking them. 22 The number of partnerships held by firm i is then the number of firms that are separated from i by a distance of 1. The average number of partnerships in the industry is given in the left panel of Figure 2 .
Below approximately θ = 0.2 autarchy reigns, i.e. no two firms find it mutually beneficial to form a partnership. Increasing task decomposition increases the average degree monotonically to a maximum at θ = 1, when tasks can be perfectly sub-divided. The effect of structural embeddedness (1 − α) on degree is also positive. Both of these effects are consistent with the discussion in Section 5. In addition to these pure effects, there is also a cross-effect: the influence of α on degree is much stronger when θ is large. When a firm can effectively gather information about its partners' partners, it has access to a larger set of possible collaborators and has finer beliefs about the likelihood of success. In a world where partnerships are rare the effect is only marginal, but when there is active networking, as associated with high decomposability of innovation, structural embeddedness has an important multiplier effect. 22 The generalized distance between pairs of firms is obtained as follows. Define ω as the weighted graph of alliances over history, with ω (i, j) the frequency with which firms i and j have partnered together. There are typically many paths s = (s 0 , s 1 , . . . , s z ) with s 0 = i and s z = j between i and j but different paths can be more or less common. Each such path has an associated probability of being activated Q s = Q l=1,...,z ω (s l−1 , s l ) and a length z ≥ 1. Define the distance as the length of the most frequent path s * between i and j (s * = arg max s Q s ). This is a definition of generalized distance employed by UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2002 ). Do all firms engage in networking with equal intensity? To answer this question we compute the normalized degree centralization index and display it in the right panel of Figure 2 .
23 Degree centralization is low in general, implying a relatively even distribution of alliances across firms. In a small region ranging from 0.4 to 0.8 along the θ axis and below 0.2 on the α axis, centralization is high, indicating that some firms have many partnerships while many other firms have only a few. A question that would be of interest to managers is whether these networked firms are better off.
To address this, we compute the correlation coefficient between degree and knowledge, measured by innovative potential. 24 It is displayed in the left panel in Figure 3 . The sign of the correlation between degree and performance depends on the parameter configuration. The striking observation in this figure is that in the (α, θ)-space, the correlation between degree and performance is high where centralization is high (right panel of Figure 2 ). When α is high, whether or not a firm has many connections (relative to other firms) has little effect on performance (the correlation is roughly zero). But when α is low, being at the centre of a star is very valuable. This is a strategy that a firm could actively pursue in order to increase its knowledge levels. But of course the strategy may be globally self-defeating: if all firms try to be stars the net effect would be that degree 23 The normalized degree centralization index is
, with n i the number of partnerships involving i and ∆ = max i n i . Normalized centralization is the sum of individual deviations from the largest individual number of partnerships over the maximum possible value of that sum (obtained in the case of a star: n − 1 firms having deviation equal to n − 2 and one having zero deviation). The closer to 1 the centralization index is, the more unequal (centralized) the link distribution is.
24 Because in this model firms are driven by knowledge production, a natural one-dimensional measure of firm i's knowledge would be its ability to produce new knowledge using its existing knowledge as inputs, φ(v i ) (see Equation 2 ). This is the firm's innovative potential, and is a more meaningful scalar measure of knowledge than, for instance, a simple sum of the firms' different knowledge types. increases without any firm becoming more central.
Over the history of the economy, firms can change their ranking in terms of innovative potential and it is natural to inquire whether this change correlates with networking activity. The correlation coefficient between change in rank and network degree is shown in the right panel in Figure 3 . Below θ = 0.2 firms innovate in isolation, and the correlation coefficient is zero by definition. For θ immediately above 0.2, however, where only a few firms are in partnerships, networking is highly correlated with increases in rank. Networked firms achieve large improvements in their competitive standing, regardless of the importance of structural versus relational ties. The effect weakens as θ increases. When average degree is low, it is very valuable for a firm to have many connections in terms of improving rank.
Neighbourhoods
Moving now to firms' neighbourhoods, we now ask whether small groups of densely interconnected firms form in our model. The clustering (or cliquishness) coefficient is the average ratio of actual to possible alliances between a firm's partners, or equivalently the ratio of existing over possible triangles. 25 In the left panel of Figure 4 we display average cliquishness over the (α, θ)-space. In the right panel Figure 4 we normalize cliquishness by the expected cliquishness of an equivalent (having same size and average degree) random network. 25 The cliquishness of firm i 's neighbourhood is obtained by dividing the number of partnerships among firm i's partners by the number of possible partnerships. Formally the numerator is P j,l∈Γi X (j, l) , with Γ i the list of firm i's partners and X (j, l) the indicator of {d (j, l) = 1}. The denominator is n i (n i − 1) /2, the number of possible partnerships among i's partners. The clustering coefficient is the average taken over all the firms. In the zone in which partnerships never form (θ < 0.2 approximately) firms innovate in isolation, which by convention gives a cliquishness coefficient of zero. Increasing task decomposition has a non-monotonic effect: clustering rises before falling again, reaching a peak between 0.2 and 0.6 along the θ axis. As anticipated in Section 5, clustering increases as structural information becomes more important relative to relational information: noticeable clustering emerges when α falls below 0.5. The effect of structural embeddedness is particularly marked when θ is between 0.2 and 0.6. This measure of cliquishness can be misleading, though, as it is strongly correlated to the degree of the graph. As firms acquire more links, even at random, the network become locally more dense. In the right panel of Figure 4 we display rescaled cliquishness: values significantly larger than 1 indicate a structure richer than a random graph. Here there is a very clear effect of both θ and α, with highly clustered networks emerging when structural embeddedness is important, and when innovation is not decomposable. Note that both absolute and re-scaled clustering fall in the upper left corner, suggesting the erosion of structure when the network becomes more dense.
How do cliquishness and performance relate? As above we compute the correlation coefficients between neighbourhood cliquishness and both absolute (innovative potential) and relative (rank change) performance.
The left and right panels in Figure 5 look very much alike, with performance and neighbourhood cliquishness correlating positively in a region starting around 0.3 on the θ axis, moving up and to the right. From Figure 5 we see that the correlation between cliquishness and performance is high approximately where cliquishness itself is high. This suggests that managers following a knowledge-oriented strategy (as opposed to a networkoriented one) will not be led too far astray. As it naturally creates cliques in regions of the parameter space where clustering is good for performance. However, it also suggests that if an industry occupies this space, a firm that is for some reason not embedded in a clique may fall behind in the knowledge race, and so might actively pursue a clique-joining strategy. There also exists a region of higher decomposability (θ ≥ 0.5) where cliquishness falls but the correlation remains high. In this zone a firm can gain advantage by pursuing a strategy aimed at increasing the strength of its local cluster.
A concern for policy makers and managers alike is the average distance between nodes in a network, as this is often thought to affect how rapidly knowledge travels through an industry or an economy. The right panel in Figure 6 shows average distances in the network. As in a disconnected network average distance is infinite, disconnected networks are excluded from the average at each point in the (α, θ) space. When θ is small, none of the networks connects. This is due to the high prevalence of autarchic innovation. When θ exceeds 0.4, a single connected component emerges. As soon as the network is connected, the pattern is driven by both θ and α and mirrors the degree pattern, falling as we move to the upper left corner in both directions. Again average distance is strongly correlated to the degree of the graph and thus in the right panel of Figure 6 we present the average distance normalized by the average distance of an equivalent random graph (the random benchmark is equal to ln (n) over the logarithm of the average degree). While distances are always larger than they are in a random network and become more so as both θ and α increase, they never exceed 2 which indicates that in general firms are relatively close together in network space.
These findings suggest the existence of several distinct regions in the (θ, α) space. When α is large, as θ increases the emergent network structure changes from isolated firms (θ < Figure 1 ). By contrast, when α is small the pattern is richer. For θ < 0.2 again we see isolated firms; but when 0.2 < θ < 0.35 a caveman graph emerges as small groups of firms who are densely connected within themselves (high absolute and normalized cliquishness) remain isolated from each other (disconnected network); as θ increases further, clique-spanning ties form and the network exhibits small world properties (top panel in Figure 1 ): the largest component is sparse (Figure 2 ), cliquish ( Figure 4 ) and connected with short characteristic distances ( Figure 6 ). Finally increasing θ further generates a denser random graph (middle panel in Figure 1 ).
The innovation system
Finally we move to the aggregate level and consider two features of a knowledge system, the distribution of knowledge, and the degree of specialization, which are of interest at a higher level of aggregation. 26 We comment briefly on knowledge distribution before showing the results on specialization.
The coefficient of variation of individual innovative potential falls monotonically with θ and is (roughly) independent of α. The relative importance of structurally versus relationally acquired information has little effect on the dispersion of knowledge, but there is a clear negative relationship between decomposability and equity. In the autarchy region inequality in knowledge is driven by initial conditions: firms with a larger endowment in the initial random assignment make larger innovations and grow faster, thereby magnifying initial differences. By contrast, as firms have more and more partners, which happens as θ increases, the distribution of innovative potential flattens out. Joint innovation implies that partners move towards each other in knowledge space, both in terms of where their expertise lies and (in relative terms) how much knowledge they possess. this effect is stronger when θ is larger and this drives the pattern described.
Over time, innovation changes knowledge profiles, and the extent of a firm's specialization. We can measure a firm's specialization by the coefficient of variation of knowledge levels. A firm knowing significantly more in one category than in the others can be called a specialist; a firm with roughly equal amounts of knowledge of each type is a generalist. 27 In the left panel in Figure 7 we display the average individual specialization over the population. The effect of θ is clear: the degree of specialization falls as innovation becomes more separable. 28 Firms become highly specialized when they innovate as individuals because the type of knowledge produced is probabilistically the same as the knowledge input. In expected value this will lead a firm to innovate always in the same knowledge type, and so drive extreme specialization. When alliances form in a more systematic way (larger θ) a firm will sometimes innovate in its speciality, sometimes in its partner's. This will smooth the firm's profile. This sort of variety in where a firm innovates produces much flatter profiles, and more so the more partners a firm has.
Are they better off? The coefficient of correlation between specialization and innovative potential (not shown graphically) is less than −0.7 over the entire parameter space. Thus less specialized firms have higher innovative potential. Firms adopting strategies leading to variety in their knowledge are more successful in terms of long term knowledge levels and in terms of improved rank within the industry Finally we inquire whether the industry shows visible patterns of specialization at an aggregated level. To address this issue we construct a virtual economy-wide knowledge vector. Each firm has, at the end of the simulation, an innovative potential. Its type is determined (probabilistically) by the firm's knowledge vector. Each element of the economy vector is the sum of the innovative potentials of that type. To evaluate specialization at the aggregate level, we compute the coefficient of variation on that vector.
The right panel in Figure 7 shows that at the aggregate level as θ increases the industry becomes more specialized. This is precisely the opposite relation observed at the level of the individual firm.
In the left panel we saw that when firms innovate as individuals (low θ) they specialize. Due to the random initial conditions, roughly a fifth of them specialize in each category, and thus the economy as a whole is perfectly general. By contrast when decomposability is large, firms are generalists but the industry itself displays a tendency to go in a single direction: it is specialized. This can happen even if firms are largely generalist. Outside the extreme case of precisely equal amounts of knowledge in each category, firms will have (at least) one category weaker than others. When they are in partnership, two firms innovate in the same category, increasing their knowledge levels there, making other categories relatively weaker. Particularly when firms have large numbers of partners this effect can cascade through the economy, and the population of firms, while generalists, can share the same weak category. At the aggregate level, this can translate into a large coefficient of variation, and so produce the appearance of a specialized economy.
This observation has important policy implications. If there is an exogenous shift in the technological regime, and economy must respond. A specialized economy can be trapped in an inappropriate regime; a generalist economy can be more flexible, and so robust to outside shocks. However, even if the economy is generalist, it can be that every individual firm is specialized. Firms can have difficulty responding, and so the economy, while appearing robust to shocks, in fact is brittle. One possible solution to this problem is the creation of cliques of diverse firms, and so creating flexibility at the meso level (this flexibility is one of the well-known advantages of network organizations). The important issue, though, is that even if an economy appears flexible at the macro level, policy makers must always be alert to the risk of a fallacy of (de-)composition.
Discussion and Conclusion
In the model developed here, firms are motivated solely by knowledge creation. In their decision-making, they pay no attention to effects on, or consequences of network position or structure. Nonetheless, networks form which are not random, but which have identifiable structural properties. One of the contributions of the paper is to provide a link between the knowledge regime and the network structure that emerges from bilateral co-operation in knowledge production. The decomposition of the innovation process into distinct sub-tasks implies that firms look for partners whose knowledge complements their own in the sense of showing different expertise. But repeated interactions generate similarity between partners' knowledge. Jointly, these effects imply that firms will have distinct partners over time. A second contribution concerns the importance of "second-hand" information about potential partners. When this is valuable, and firms can rely on their former partners for information about third parties, a firm has a larger number of credible potential partners since it can gather reliable information about more firms. This is a force favouring large numbers of partners. In addition when information comes indirectly through former partners, triangles of firms tend to form, which increases local clustering.
The dynamics that follow from these two aspects of the knowledge regime appear in our numerical results. We observe that when the innovation process is decomposable into different sub-tasks, and when information about potential partners gathered from indirect sources is relatively valuable, dense structures with low average distances emerge. In addition, networks show high local clustering when indirect information matters and when the decomposability of innovation is in an intermediate range. A striking result regarding knowledge specialization is that patterns differ at firm and economy levels. As task decomposability increases, firms specialize less and become generalists over time. By contrast, aggregating knowledge to the economy level implies that specialization increases as innovation is more and more decomposed.
These effects of indirect information and task decomposability generate several parameter regimes in which different networks structures are typical. When only direct information is valuable, we see isolated individuals or sparse random networks when decomposability is weak or strong respectively. However, when structural embeddedness is important and indirect information becomes more valuable, increasing innovation decomposability changes the network structure from isolated individuals to small disconnected caves of densely connected firms, to a small world and finally to a random network.
Correlations between structural parameters of the networks and absolute and relative performance measures provide some suggestions both for managers and policy makers. When innovation decomposability and the importance of structural embeddedness are such that stars form in the network, firms at the centre of the stars perform better than other firms (both in terms of absolute knowledge levels, and in terms of change in rank in the industry). In this region, active pursuit by a firm of these central positions is an appropriate strategy since success would imply an improvement in competitive position relative to the rest of the industry. Throughout the parameter space the correlation between local clustering and performance is positive, being especially strong when indirect information is important. Here, the advantage for a firm of being structurally embedded is very strong, and here it would be appropriate to devote resources to clique-building activities. Finally, policy-makers are often interested in whether an economy is robust to external technological shocks. Two of our results are important. First, the level of aggregation matters. An economy that appears to be flexible in aggregate may be completely inflexible at the firm level, since aggregate non-specialization is generated by a population of firms, each a specialist, but in different areas. Active promotion of networking and joint knowledge production can alleviate this problem. In addition, though, if firm flexibility at the individual level is important, policies supporting knowledge codification may be valuable, as codification is likely to ease the separation of innovation into different tasks. In our model it has the general effect of creating generalist firms over time.
We must acknowledge that the model presented here has a strong focus, and necessarily abstracts from various aspects of alliance creation. Thus there are several directions in which the model could be extended. We have emphasized the absence of "network" motives on the part of firms. One obvious extension is to include them. A firm could consider the current state of the network and whether a particular alliance would create for it a cliquespanning, or a clique-building tie, for example. Indeed, if different firms pursue different strategies, perhaps changing them over time, the model could be used to explore issues surrounding the value of different network strategies in different contexts, contributing to the debate over the value of structural holes and dense local information flows.
The tension we have explored, between information gathered in relational versus structurally embedded contexts, is a special case of information being distributed throughout the network, and firms being circumscribed in their abilities to look for it. A relatively simple generalization would be to permit firms to acquire information over longer and longer paths. Intuitively, it seems that regarding cliquishness the distance of 2 is critical, since it is information at that distance that causes triangles to close. However, this is an issue that could be explored with little change to the model. Additionally, this could be endogenized, if search were costly, with costs increasing in distance. At each stage firms could decide how far afield to look. This enriches the behaviour set of the firms but would demand much more detailed micro-economics.
The other parameter, regarding the decomposability of innovation, could also be endogenized. Trust regarding both motives and competence is necessary for one partner to permit the other to do part of the job in isolation. As trust between partners increases, they will be more willing to allow the tasks to be divided. The literature on trust argues that repeated interaction builds trust. What this suggests is that an endogenization along these lines would drive more inertia into network structures.
Finally, it is worth observing that the raw data produced by our numerical experiments, namely the weighted connection matrix, is very much like the raw data on strategic alliances. Databases on alliances tend to record starting dates of formal alliances for knowledge production. Treating that as one link between two firms, and recording firms over time creates a weighted connection matrix. The fit there suggests that interesting empirical work could be done if independent measures of task separability, and the importance of distant information in partner evaluation can be devised.
Discussions of networks that arise from alliance formation, and empirical investigations of real networks emphasize the importance of embedded interactions. The formal model presented here shows a process by which the embeddedness of interactions translates into different network structures. Small worlds are commonly found in alliance networks, but they are not the only structure present in empirical results. The model we have developed can generate different network structures, depending on parameters, and in particular shows when small worlds can be expected, depending not only on the nature of the embedded relations, but also on the nature of the innovation task itself. Our results underline the observation that embedded relations are central in explaining the network structures that we observe, but they also show the importance of understanding how firms actually combine their knowledge to create innovations.
